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Abstract
This paper addresses the role of time and meaning-making in the global mediascape. Particular attention will 
be paid to the role of past and future narratives, connections of messages with a global outreach and time as 
a topic of communication. The empirical analysis will use a comparative approach to explore these different 
dimensions by analysing three global media events, such as, the sinking of the Titanic, the assassination US 
President John F. Kennedy and the Fukushima Daiichi incident. The main findings of the paper will show that 
time is a constitutional part in the process of meaning-making in global communication.
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1 Time, globalisation and 
communication technologies
A number of theories link the emergence 
of globalisation to the development of 
new communication technologies such as 
satellites, fibre cable and mobile phones 
(Waters, 1995; Sklair, 1999; Faulstich & 
Steininger, 2000; Kellner & Pierce, 2007; 
Axford, 2013). In this context, Harvey 
(1991) overviewed transport and com-
munication technologies since the six-
teenth century. In those early days, the 
average maximum speed of horse-drawn 
coaches and sailing ships was 10 mph. 
By the 1970s, jet passenger aircraft were 
flying at speeds of 500–700 mph, effec-
tively making the world 50 times smaller. 
However, there is general consensus that 
the global age more fully emerged with 
the development of new communication 
technologies in the 1970s – notably satel-
lite- and computer-based forms of com-
munication – that render communication 
time invariant over distance. Coupled with 
mass television, satellite communication 
enables people everywhere to access me-
dia communications at the same time, 
variously described as an annihilation or 
compression of space and time (Harvey, 
1991), a distanciation and emptying of 
time and space (Giddens, 1990; Appadu-
rai, 1990) and a temporal acceleration of 
interlinkages across distant regions (Lash 
& Urry, 1994; Castells, 1996). Although in-
fluential models of global communication 
all highlight time (pace, acceleration and 
change), or even the annihilation of time, 
no systematic view of the interaction of 
time, communication and globalisation 
has been developed beyond the merely 
technological. These accounts render time 
irrelevant or neutral rather than exploring 
it as a constitutive dimension of global 
communication, which is discussed main-
ly in social terms. For instance, theories of 
global media discuss critically the social 
effects of the global mass dissemination of 
media products as leading to socio-cultur-
al homogenisation (Tomlinson, 1991) or to 
the replacement of a socially stable world 
by global flows and contra-flows that 
change constantly and quickly over time 
(Thussu, 2012). A similar line of thought 
informs discussion of global media 
events.1 An important study by Dayan and 
Katz (1992) introduces the idea of time as 
interruption of routines – that is, processes 
with set durations – replaced by other pro-
cesses that take on a ritual function. In this 
way, the social dimension is foregrounded 
1 Roche (2003) raises the issue of time, but 
only in contrast to the everyday experience 
of time and not media events themselves.
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to engender a sense of community in the 
face of crisis. Recent overviews by Could-
ry, Hepp, and Krotz (2010) and Mitu and 
Poulakidakos (2016), surveying multiple 
diverse studies of media events in a global 
age, make no mention of the issue of time. 
To address this omission, this article 
reflects on the correlation between time, 
meaning-making and the global media-
scape by developing a typology of the 
ways in which various media (e.g. news-
papers, television, social networks) con-
figure events as objects of global interest 
and concern. The main focus here is to 
characterise the configuration of events 
as a process of communicative mean-
ing-making in the context of time. (This 
line of thought is typically associated with 
pragmatist approaches; see Baert & da 
 Silva, 2010). In this paper, three important 
aspects of time will be considered: (1) the 
constitutive role of the past and future as 
sense-making strategies; (2) how media 
messages are interlinked in the present, 
and how this impacts on communicative 
meaning-making; and (3) the meta-media 
discourse around time itself. 
2 Methodology and cases
Studies of globalisation and communica-
tion technologies such as those mentioned 
above have relied strongly on examples 
combining mass television with satellite 
technologies. Recent developments in so-
cial media (Facebook or Twitter) are less 
often considered, and pre-1970s media 
technologies such as telegraphs, sea-ca-
bles, radio and newspapers also tend to be 
neglected. In exploring a possible typology 
of global communication in the context of 
time, it therefore seems relevant to select 
empirical phenomena that reflect these 
stages of its evolution. The present study 
considers three events that broadly rep-
resent these different stages: the sinking 
of the Titanic in 1912, the assassination of 
John F. Kennedy in 1963 and the Fukushi-
ma Incident in 2011. 
The Titanic disaster occurred before 
the advent of radio or television, in an age 
when global communication depended 
largely on the printing press and the mass 
distribution of newspapers. By the time of 
the assassination of John F. Kennedy new 
media like television were in widespread 
use. Finally, as the most recent event to be 
discussed here, the Fukushima catastro-
phe occurred in an age dominated by dig-
ital communication. Because this article 
is concerned with the development of a 
general typology, it is important to cover 
a variety of different events to explicate 
basic concepts. Rather than haphazard-
ly comparing a large number of cases, 
as when using certain quantitative tech-
niques, this study draws on the method 
of comparison used in Grounded Theory 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). As the selected 
events happened in three different global 
regions (North America, Western Europe 
and Asia), the contrasting data are well 
suited to this approach. While the chosen 
cases all had a significant global impact, 
duration and are still remembered, they 
occurred in quite distinct historical set-
tings and disparate media environments. 
As all of the events were reported to audi-
ences outside the countries in which they 
occurred, it seemed important here to in-
clude a range of cultural regions and their 
local programme structures. The historical 
dimension facilitates evaluation of the 
differing impacts of media technologies 
in the three cases. This seems critical, as 
perceptions of large-scale events within 
a short time are often influenced by the 
speed and instant communication capa-
bility of new media technologies. 
In summary, the three cases were se-
lected for their qualities of maximal dis-
tance or contrast, as well as some specific 
shared features that are also characteristic 
of other social phenomena. The Grounded 
Theory approach draws on Max Weber’s 
typology of ideal cases, as well as compar-
ative methodologies from functionalism 
that are now an established aspect of me-
dia research (Krotz, 2005). 
2.1 The sinking of the Titanic
Although the sinking of the passenger 
steamship RMS Titanic occurred more 
than 100 years ago, it is still remembered in 
contemporary society through Hollywood 
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movies and other media products. Only 
a few studies have discussed the sinking 
from a media events perspective, main-
ly in the context of how it is remembered 
(Heyer, 1995; Liebes, 1997). In particu-
lar, research to date has tended to focus 
on the role of cinema and other fictional 
accounts (McGee, 1999; Cox, 2003; Zani, 
2003; Keane, 2006; Brown, McDonagh, & 
Shultz, 2013) rather than on global media 
coverage of the event.
On the night of 14–15 April 1912, the 
passenger steamship RMS Titanic crashed 
into an iceberg. The ship’s SOS was relayed 
by other ships and reached a Canadian 
coast station shortly after the collision, 
from where it was passed on to New York. 
During the night, the front pages of North 
American papers were changed, but the 
mass media response to the event was still 
relatively minor. This was due to an error 
in the news relayed, which suggested that 
although the Titanic had hit an iceberg, the 
ship had not sunk but had been towed to 
Halifax (the nearest harbour), and that all 
the passengers had been saved. Nonethe-
less, mass media interest was awakened, 
and relatives travelled to the shipping 
company’s offices in New York and South-
ampton seeking more detailed informa-
tion. This information emerged soon af-
ter, prompting widespread reaction. “The 
world’s greatest steamship disaster” was 
the headline in the 16 April 1912 edition of 
the USA’s Easton Express. In similar vein, 
the Straits Times of Singapore reported 
“The most appalling shipping disaster on 
record”. (“Great Ship Sinks”, 1912, p. 7). The 
German newspaper Frankfurter Zeitung 
(“Frühere Schiffskatastrophen”, 1912, p. 2) 
called the sinking of the steamship Titan-
ic: “the greatest of all ship accidents ever 
to occur”. The New York Times of 16 April 
1912 (“Titanic Sinks”, 1912, p. 1) reported 
that “The Titanic, the biggest steamship of 
the world, had been sunk by an iceberg.” 
The headline of the British Daily Sketch (as 
cited in Bryceson 1997, p. 16) ran “Biggest 
boat in the world collides with an iceberg”.
The global reaction and the extraordi-
nary quality, weight and relevance of the 
event are not determined by the fact of ca-
tastrophe alone; the sense of the extraor-
dinary derives from a mode of comparison 
employed as a sense-making strategy. For 
instance, the evening edition of the Frank-
furter Zeitung (“Frühere Schiffskatastro-
phen”, 1912, p. 2) published a compari-
son of shipping accidents in the 40 years 
preceding 1912 to characterise this as the 
greatest shipping disaster in recent histo-
ry in terms of loss of human life.2 A sim-
ilar list was published in the Daily Sketch 
(“The sinking of the Titanic is the greatest 
disaster that has ever overtaken a liner in 
point of loss of life”, as cited in Bryceson, 
1997, p. 26), and in the New York Times 
(“Many Great Liners Paid Toll of the Sea”, 
1912, p. 8), which provided an even more 
detailed list of other marine disasters since 
the 1850s. 
These comparisons were extended to 
encompass a range of other catastroph-
ic events – for instance, in the New York 
Times editorial, a comparison was drawn 
with the San Francisco earthquake of 1906 
(“Editorial Note”, p. 2 and “Lloyds Stag-
gered by Loss”, 1912, p. 1). The past is pre-
sented here in quantitative mode; no other 
event in recent history could be compared 
to the profound loss and destruction 
caused by the sinking of the Titanic. How-
ever, in a more reflective comparison, the 
Lisbon Earthquake (see Landauer 1912, 
p. 1) was discussed in the wider context of 
sense-making – why do these events oc-
cur, and what can be done about them? In 
this way, the past is presented not simply 
as a matter of fact but as a point of refer-
ence and reflection, against which current 
events can be contextualised. 
This reflective quality is more appar-
ent in media coverage that presents events 
as a point in time that alters the future 
development of humankind, and in the 
discourse about time itself – referring in 
particular here to the time-independence 
of communication technologies (in this 
case, the wireless telegraph). Media cov-
erage addressed the future incidentally 
2 In several cases, these comparisons with a 
global event adopt a regional outlook. For in-
stance, the Sydney Morning Herald (“Loss of 
the Titanic” 1912, p. 18) reminded its readers 
of the recent loss of ships from its own coun-
try, such as the Waratah and the Yongala.
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and in more factual fashion, discussing for 
instance how the Titanic disaster would 
affect regulation and the perceived safety 
of marine travel. However, more profound 
readings have a more fictional quality, in-
terpreting the disaster in the context of 
civilisation itself. According to Elias (2000, 
p. 6), the term civilised “describes a so-
cial quality of people […] which does not 
refer directly to people themselves, but 
exclusively to particular human accom-
plishments”. Representing the highest 
state of human development, this defini-
tion “emphasizes what is common to all 
human beings” (Elias 2000, p. 7). In some 
media coverage, the Titanic was presented 
as one such peak of humanity’s techno-
logical progress. According to the press, 
the Titanic was “The world’s greatest and 
most luxurious liner” (“Practically unsink-
able”, 1912). It was the fastest steamship 
in the world, with the latest technological 
equipment (wireless telegraph and au-
tomatic self-closing bulkhead doors; see 
“Eine Äußerung des Generaldirektors Bal-
lin”, 1912) and the “Titanic was the last cry 
and the faultless reach in the science and 
art of shipbuilding. It was supposed to be 
irreproachable and incomparable” (“The 
Titanic Crime”, 1912). 
This notion of a historic peak is part 
of a scenario that questions the future 
progress of civilisation. Here, the notion of 
progress was seen to be defeated by a fail-
ure to take account of the forces of nature 
(see Heckscher, cited in Köster & Lischeid, 
2000, p. 39). The drive for new records 
and higher profits may have led to the ca-
tastrophe; the press mentions high speed 
despite the iceberg warning, as well as an 
insufficient number of rescue boats, which 
led to many deaths (see “Lack of Lifeboats 
Believed to Be Cause of the Heavy Loss 
on the Great White Star Liner”, 1912; “The 
Titanic Crime”, 1912; “Der Untergang der 
‘Titanic’”, 1912). In other words, society’s 
drive towards progress has caused its own 
downfall, and in this sense, the catastro-
phe has a contingent quality, as it might 
have been prevented if society were not 
driven by these norms.
This contingent quality was another 
important narrative informing media cov-
erage of these events, taking the form of a 
discourse on reversed time and the instan-
taneity of the wireless telegraph, and how 
this technology might have relayed news 
of the accident just in time. Reversed time, 
referring to a fictional discourse that imag-
ines how a catastrophe might be reversed, 
is in fact central to the Ancient Greek con-
cept of catastrophe, which meant an over-
turning of something. In the case of the 
Titanic’s sinking, the Manchester Guardian 
suggested that “A continuous wireless ser-
vice should be made compulsory on every 
ship” (“Lessons of the Disaster: How to 
Guard against its Repetition”, 1912, p. 10), 
as this may have prevented the tragedy. 
According to the New York Times, “Wire-
less Instruments on the Seas Should Be 
Available Continually” (“Wireless only on 
50 Ships”, 1912, p. 3). These and other re-
ports shared the view that this technology 
“uses the air waves in the service of com-
munication” (Landauer 1912, p. 1); that 
its “speeding messages” made an “almost 
magic use of the air” (“Wireless Crowns a 
Remarkable Record as Life-Saver”, 1912, 
p. SM2); or reported “the benefit of wire-
less as being so instantaneous” (Wireless 
and the Titanic, 1912, p. 8). This discourse 
on time and on the instantaneous quality 
of wireless emphasises how it might have 
prevented the disasters altogether – that is, 
how it might have reversed time.3 
These references to wireless telegra-
phy and submarine cables in newspapers 
that appeared several times daily prompt-
ed a communication dynamic in which 
the mass media simulated reactions to 
the catastrophe as a global interaction 
(Kern, 1983). This is exemplified in vari-
ous nations’ messages of condolence and 
sympathy, notably the British and Ger-
man reactions as reported in the German 
press and the responses in Singapore’s 
Straits Times and Australia’s Sydney Morn-
ing Herald. The German Reichstag opened 
at 2.30 p.m. on April 16, 1912 with a me-
morial speech by President of the Cham-
ber Kämpf (“Beileidsbekundungen im 
3 The story of the courageous wireless opera-
tor who served until his death is not only re-
ported, but receives widespread illustration 
in newspapers around the globe. 
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Reichstag – Abendblatt”, 1912; “Beileids-
bekundungen im Reichstag – Erstes Mor-
genblatt”, 1912). Kämpf expressed his pain 
at the loss of many relatives and friends 
from other countries, explicitly empha-
sising the British people’s loss while also 
mentioning his own nation’s loss. Just two 
days later, the speech was also reported 
in Australia’s Sydney Morning Herald (“In 
the Reichstag”, 1912, p. 9). A similar event 
in the British House of Commons on April 
16, 1912 was also picked up by the Ger-
man press (“Beileidsbekundungen im en-
glischen Unterhaus”, 1912). 
These reports were then thematised 
as reactions to the event became news in 
itself. The Straits Times reported that the 
German Reichstag stood up as a sign of 
sympathy as the President expressed his 
condolences to Great Britain and other 
nations (Untitled, The Straits Times, 1912), 
and the House of Commons session was 
also commented upon (“Prime Minister’s 
Statement”, 1912). On 18 April, the Straits 
Times further reported that the British 
monarch and Queen Alexandra, the Ger-
man Kaiser and Prince Henry of Prussia 
had all expressed their sympathy and con-
dolences (“Titanic Disaster”, 1912), and 
that “The Kaiser has telegraphed to King 
George his sympathy, and other expres-
sions of world-wide sympathy have been 
received” (“The Kaiser’s Sympathy”, 1912). 
And despite the great distance between 
Germany and Singapore, the same report 
was to be found in the Frankfurter Zeitung 
of the same day. 
Among many other such reactions, 
which became increasingly reciprocal, an 
excerpt from the German Kaiser’s telegram 
was printed in the Frankfurter Zeitung, fol-
lowed by excerpts from British reactions 
(“Der Untergang der Titanic”, 1912). On 19 
April, as well as reporting on the donations 
sent by many nations, the Straits Times re-
ferred to the sympathy and condolences 
expressed by King George and the British 
Queen and by President Taft of the Unit-
ed States (“Titanic Disaster”, 1912). Taft’s 
response was printed alongside an item 
entitled “The American people share the 
sorrow of kinsmen oversea‘s” (“Memorial 
Service in London”, 1912, p. 9). The same 
chain of responses was covered in the Aus-
tralian Press; the Sydney Morning Herald 
reported on the message of King George 
and the reply from President Taft under 
the headline “Community of Grief” (1912). 
In turn, Sir Edward Grey of the British For-
eign Office offered his thanks for the many 
expressions of condolences from across 
the globe (“Memorial Service in London”, 
1912). On 19 April, the German press re-
ported on the British reaction to the Ger-
man Reichstag’s reaction and President 
Kämpf’s speech, in which the British gov-
ernment expressed its thanks and simul-
taneously offered its condolences for the 
loss of German passengers (“Deutscher 
Reichstag”, 1912). These reactions to the 
reactions then became the subject of mass 
media reports, creating circular interlink-
ages, as in “News of the ‘Titanic’s’ distress 
and cry for help was heard throughout the 
world almost simultaneously” (Landauer, 
1912, p. 1) or the Sydney Morning Herald’s 
“World-wide Sympathy” (1912).
This brief overview of internation-
al press coverage of the Titanic sinking 
captures the interaction of time, commu-
nication and meaning-making in three 
different dimensions. The past provided 
a context in which to assess and evaluate 
the event, to contrast it with other events, 
and to establish its exceptional nature. 
The future informed a narrative of reflec-
tion and criticism and linked the sinking 
to a broader discussion of human progress 
and safety. In this context, there emerged 
in particular a discourse on time, with 
particular reference to the role of wireless 
telegraphy. Here, the emphasis was on the 
contingent nature of the event and how it 
might have been prevented if the seem-
ingly instant technology of the wireless 
telegraph had been standard. Finally, the 
overview illustrates how media reporting 
of the event was interlinked with other 
media messages across the globe, creating 
density and inner meaning. 
2.2 The assassination of John F. Kennedy
Like the Titanic, John F. Kennedy remains 
an icon in popular culture and media folk-
lore (see DeLloyd & Wrone, 1980; Frewin, 
1993; Edges, 2003), and a number of pub-
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lished studies have explored media cov-
erage of his assassination in 1963. In the 
first of these, Baker (1965) focused solely 
on American newspapers, excluding tele-
vision or any global coverage of the event. 
Ralston (1996) was more international in 
scope but examined the reactions in the 
world of sport rather than in the mass 
media. While most of the research on this 
subject is historical in focus and address-
es political descriptions of the assassina-
tion rather than media coverage (Ralston 
1999), some studies discuss the role of col-
lective memory and journalism (Zelizer, 
1992), filmic accounts of the assassination 
(Simon, 1996) and the impact of television 
coverage on image practices in contempo-
rary society (Lubin, 2003). In their research 
on media events, Dayan and Katz (1992) 
used the assassination as a key example, 
but they focused solely on the burial and 
did not consider TV coverage from other 
countries.
On 22 November 1963, at 11:30 a.m. 
local time (Central Standard Time), Air 
Force One landed at Love Airfield in Dal-
las, Texas. Following a reception at the air-
port, President John F. Kennedy, Governor 
John Connally of Texas and their wives 
climbed into an open limousine and set 
off in convoy through downtown Dallas. 
At 12:30 CST, several shots rang out, and 
at 12:32, the local radio station WFAA re-
ported that Kennedy had been shot. ABC 
Radio’s Don Gardiner reported three shots 
fired at 12:36, and at the same time (12:36), 
NBC television was already discussing 
the events with Robert McNeil. About five 
minutes after the shooting, the first report 
by Merriman Smith went out on UPI’s 
wire service. The three major television 
networks then interrupted their program-
ming – CBS at 12:43, ABC at 12:48 and NBC 
at 12:53 – to provide continuous live cover-
age of events as they unfolded. 
In Germany, half an hour after the 
shooting at 20:00 local time (Central Eu-
ropean Time), TV broadcasting was inter-
rupted by a news programme reporting 
on the events in Dallas (Die Tagesschau, 
22 November 1963, 20:00, archive number 
2844).4 By this time (some 30 minutes after 
the shooting), 68% of the U.S. population 
had been informed of the event (Sheats-
ley & Feldman, 1965, p. 152). At 13:27 CST, 
CBS anchor Walter Cronkite announced 
that President Kennedy had died, with of-
ficial confirmation following at 13:35. At 
approximately 20:30 CET, ARD (German 
television) broadcast the report and aban-
doned its regular schedule for the day. At 
14:13 CST, UPI wires reported that a sus-
pect had been arrested in a cinema; within 
the next hour, he was named as Lee Har-
vey Oswald. During this same time frame, 
news was broadcast of the swearing-in of 
Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson as the 
new president. Within less than two hours 
of the shooting, the message had reached 
92% of the U.S. population (Sheatsley & 
Feldman, 1965, p. 152). The BBC and oth-
er European radio and television channels 
in Ireland, France, Italy and elsewhere 
echoed the German news reaction, and 
the report was broadcast on Moscow 
television’s evening news at 10:00 p.m. 
(Brigham, 1963). Radio and television sta-
tions in other Eastern European countries, 
such as Hungary and the former Yugosla-
via, also interrupted their programming. 
Because of the time difference, the 
news reached Asia during the night. Japan 
was one of the first countries in the region 
to receive the news at 4:00 a.m. local time. 
Many Japanese rose early to follow the 
first ever live trans-Pacific broadcast from 
the United States. Before the broadcast, 
Shinzo Koike, Minister of Posts and Tele-
communications, announced that Kenne-
dy had been the victim of an assassination 
attempt (“Slaying cancels US-Japan talks”, 
The New York Times, 1963, p. 12). Even in 
the Antarctic, at the outer limits of civili-
sation, the news reached the U.S. Marine 
Base at McMurdo Sound within 90 minutes 
and was retransmitted 20 minutes later to 
the outstation at the South Pole (cf. “Me-
morial Service at Antarctic Base”, The Ma-
lay Mail, 1963, p. 2). 
Media coverage of the event, then, was 
on a global scale and almost simultaneous, 
4 The reel number and timeline refer to archi-
val holdings of the German news coverage of 
the event, as in the ARD archive in Hamburg.
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leading to an interlinking of reactions that 
in turn informed the media event itself. 
By way of illustration, the present analy-
sis will examine media coverage of Soviet 
media reaction in other countries around 
the world. This analysis will focus more on 
the temporal aspect of these connections 
than on the subject matter (re. the latter, 
see Dunning, 1964).
One of the first reports covered by the 
Soviet news agency TASS related to specu-
lation about reasons for the assassination, 
as already broadcast on NBC at 3.30pm 
EST on 22 November 1963. According to 
NBC, news of the assassination was of in-
terest beyond the Soviet media and was 
relayed immediately to political elites in 
Moscow. The event interrupted sched-
uled programmes on soviet broadcaster, 
and this interruption itself became a news 
item and was reported by NBC. At around 
5:45 p.m. EST (Reel 7–22.11.1963 24:35),5 
NBC broadcast statements from a number 
of Soviet politicians and other important 
figures. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Andrei Gromyko, was quoted as express-
ing his shock and condolences, and NBC 
further reported that the general public 
in the Soviet Union had been informed of 
events. At around 6:00 p.m., NBC report-
ed this report, adding that these reactions 
from the Soviet Union reflected reactions 
around the globe. 
One of the first messages broadcast 
by NBC the following morning (at around 
7:00 a.m. EST) stated that President John-
son had received a message from Pres-
ident Khrushchev (Reel 20–23.11.1963 
03:13), who described the loss of John F. 
Kennedy as a loss to world peace and co-
operation between the two countries. NBC 
further reported that Khrushchev wore 
a black suit when he went to the Ameri-
can Embassy to sign a message of condo-
lence. The TV station emphasised that this 
act was unusual for the Soviet statesman 
(Reel 20–23.11.1963 03:51). That report 
was followed shortly after by pictures of 
5 The reel number and timeline refer to archi-
val holdings of the NBC news coverage of the 
event, as in the JFK Library in Boston. The 
time refers to the time as on the respective 
reel.
this episode (Reel 24–23.11.1963 20:05), 
adding that Khrushchev had declared his 
intention to send Gromyko to the funeral. 
The extraordinary quality of these acts was 
highlighted in the media in presenting the 
two men as fierce opponents on a global 
level, pointing to the assassination’s future 
consequences: “Two men held the world 
in their hands, now one is dead […] his 
passing will affect all spheres of life not 
only in your country, but throughout the 
globe” (Reel 25–23.11.1963 14:15). This fu-
ture dimension was linked to the new U.S. 
President Lyndon B. Johnson, and media 
reported further exchanges between the 
two world leaders. NBC also reported that 
Soviet television broadcast footage of the 
funeral, as well as reports about Soviet ra-
dio and newspaper messages, over the fol-
lowing three days. 
The German 8pm news programme 
Die Tagesschau (Reel No. 2845) also 
showed footage of Khrushchev and his sig-
nature of condolence. The filmic account 
was accompanied by a report that Khrush-
chev had described Kennedy’s death as a 
shock for all for those who believe in world 
peace and for cooperation between the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union. That broadcast 
also stated that Khrushchev had interrupt-
ed his scheduled visit to the Ukraine, and 
that he had sent a direct telegram to Lyn-
don B. Johnson. The reports included the 
front page of the newspaper Pravda, which 
remained open to re-edit the newspaper. 
On the day of the funeral (25 November 
1963), a German news programme (Reel 
No 2847) reported that a mass organised 
in Moscow was attended by more than 500 
diplomats, and that also Nina Khrushchev 
had signed the book of condolences at the 
U.S. Embassy. 
In the Federation of Malaya, TV cov-
erage was more limited, as Radio-Televi-
sion Malaya was still in its early days. The 
few existing reports mainly show people 
gathering in front of the U.S. Embassy 
and reading newspapers about the event. 
While newspapers were still the main me-
dia channel, they also cited other media 
– for instance, the front page of the Sun-
day Times from 24 November 1963 quotes 
the Soviet agency TASS but also refers to 
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television and radio programmes in Mos-
cow that interrupted their broadcasts. The 
newspaper shows a still from the footage 
of Khrushchev visiting the U.S. Embas-
sy and cites his message of condolence 
(“Black Suit, Nikita Signs Book”, 1963). The 
Sunday Times noted that the assassination 
had captured the full attention of media 
in the Soviet Union and reported a wish 
to continue with existing policies (“John-
son to Continue Kennedy’s Policies”, 1963). 
The events in Moscow were increasingly 
presented as a narrative linking to events 
in the U.S. The Straits Times (26 November 
1963, p. 6) printed a picture of Khrush-
chev visiting the Embassy, and its report 
underlined this notion: “Deadline Dallas 
[…] it began with a shock on Friday, Nov. 
22: The shock registers on a famous face in 
far-away Moscow”. Khrushchev’s shocked 
reaction is described as being unable to 
grasp such an event, leading the newspa-
per to conclude that “In retrospect Presi-
dent Kennedy’s murder may be seen as the 
first world event to draw together the com-
munist and the non-communist worlds”.
The interruption of scheduled pro-
grammes and of visits became in itself a 
message. In other words, the temporal 
interruption of some planned or expect-
ed event becomes the narrative that links 
messages from various regions into a 
common flow. In the present context, the 
role of television is foregrounded as cen-
tral to the discourse around time, in the 
interruption of global communication by 
media communication itself. This inter-
ruption serves as a separating element, as 
something that was happening and would 
have continued ends and is replaced by 
another process. Global media, then, ex-
periences a double interruption, not only 
reporting the event as an interruption but 
interrupting its own program to do so: “…
television’s most powerful gesture consists 
precisely in interrupting the continuous 
flow of its programs…” (Dayan & Katz, 
1998, p. 162). In this way, media discourse 
applies the discrepancy/normalcy schema 
to itself in presenting its own processing of 
the non-processed as significant. 
The historic evolution of the mass me-
dia as separate social sphere goes hand in 
hand with regular, periodic appearance 
detached from whether something can ac-
tually be described as extraordinary or dif-
ferent (Groth, 1928). For mass media, time 
is autonomous, and has at its disposal the 
regularity of mass communication itself. 
Whatever society or mass media may see 
as a source of news, newspapers retain the 
same format and appear every day, just like 
television programmes. This standardisa-
tion and continuity have had a significant 
impact on the temporality of mass media. 
During media events, this continuity can 
be applied to mass media itself by replac-
ing one with another as a “special report” 
or “breaking news”. The conspicuousness 
of the conspicuous has a kind of twofold 
relevance that can be exponentially ex-
tended; one can report not only on the fact 
that the regular programme has been in-
terrupted but also on the behaviour of oth-
er channels: “After reporting the death of 
Kennedy, Italian TV and radio went off for 
silent music” (NBC Reel 2 & 3–22/11/1963 
47:34). This also applies to newspapers: 
“The State radio and the Irish television 
station cancelled all previously scheduled 
programs” (“Memories of visit add to Irish 
grief”, 1963, p. 5). A broadcast from the So-
viet Union declared: “Comrades, radio-lis-
teners, we have interrupted our broadcast 
because of the sorrowful report which has 
just been received from New York” (“World 
shocked”, 1963, p. 1).
Among global media, television has 
a special kind of access here. The news-
paper industry can print special pages 
or redesign front pages, but it remains in 
newspaper mode. Television, however, can 
engender a double (or even a triple) inter-
ruption. One does not simply report (as in 
the case of the newspaper) on the event as 
interruption – that is, as something that 
brings life to a standstill. (At the time of the 
Kennedy assassination, there were numer-
ous reports of cancelled sporting events, 
closed cinemas, even the closure of Disney 
Park.) Dayan and Katz (1994) referred to 
the “high holidays” of the mass media; in 
this case, the media emphasised the inter-
ruption caused by this interruption almost 
every hour over four days. The reflections 
of the event were then reflected upon so 
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many times that the event gained in size 
and scope.
The other relevant temporal aspect 
here is the role of the past in global me-
dia.6 Kennedy’s death was compared to 
the deaths of Theodore Roosevelt, Abra-
ham Lincoln, the Archduke Franz Ferdi-
nand of Austria or Gandhi of India, or to 
Pearl Harbor or the dropping of the atomic 
bomb on Hiroshima. Comparisons of this 
kind locate Kennedy’s assassination in the 
context of other well-known events. In the 
New York Times of 23 November 1963, a 
lengthy article compared assassination 
attempts on U.S. Presidents and other 
well-known personalities. To this end, it 
drew primarily on images,7 showing six 
in total: a lithograph depicting Lincoln’s 
death; an illustration of Garfield’s death 
from Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspapers; 
a painting by T. Dart Walker of McKinley’s 
assassination; a photograph of the assas-
sination attempt on Roosevelt; and a pic-
ture of the wounded assassin (lying on a 
stretcher) who attempted to kill Harry S. 
Truman. There was also a picture of Ken-
nedy, taken during his final ride through 
Dallas, accompanied by the following cap-
tion: “Moments before assassination … 
shortly after this picture was taken, rifle 
fire hit the President and the Governor”. 
This pictorial material recalled other as-
sassination attempts and focused on the 
moment of the assassination. Repetition 
of a pictorial theme enhanced the effect 
while establishing a mutually stabilised 
relevance: “a well-known photograph [...] 
then becomes even better known. There is 
a certain power of redundancy” (Goldberg, 
1991, p. 219). In this sense, one can speak 
of climactic images, which serve to make a 
particular moment visible while testifying 
to and reinforcing its relevance (Mersch, 
2006). 
6 The future was an important temporal ca-
tegory in this event, but mainly raised used 
as to speculate about future consequences, 
in particular, with regard to nuclear disbar-
ment and cooperation between the US and 
Soviet Union.   
7 There were similar reports in other media, 
see the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of 25 
November 1963, p. 5.
The concept of memory employed in 
this media discourse is that of compari-
son. Like Pearl Harbor or the assassination 
of the heir to the Austrian throne, these 
comparisons were regionally limited, es-
tablishing links with other parts of the 
world through regional comparison. In a 
global context, however, the comparison 
is between John F. Kennedy and Abraham 
Lincoln. The first obvious similarity is that 
both men were President of the United 
States, and both were assassinated – an 
unheard-of event since the death of Abra-
ham Lincoln, according to Die Tagesschau 
(23 November 1963, 20:00, archive number 
2845). But that does not particularly set 
this event apart from the case of the Titan-
ic; using event as criterion of comparison 
signals a similarity – or even, to an extent, 
a formal relationship between the cases. 
However, this case also entails a contrast, 
which can be described in terms of values. 
On ARD (German television), President 
Gerstenmaier of the German parliament 
quoted Lincoln and elevated both Ken-
nedy and Johnson as representatives of a 
tradition with a great impact on the lives of 
others.8 The Straits Times quoted a similar 
example; Kennedy was called “the second 
emancipator” by Afro-American celebri-
ties, and Lincoln was known as “the great 
emancipator” (“President’s last moments”, 
1963, p. 2). Again, Lincoln was described 
as the instigator of the civil rights move-
ment and Kennedy as “the modern Abra-
ham Lincoln”.9 Globally, then, the mass 
media linked Lincoln and Kennedy using 
the criterion of “values”. Here, the seman-
tics of “values” works at what Luhmann 
calls “inviolate levels” (2012, p. 298), in the 
sense that they are unconditional points of 
8 Eulogy of Bundestag President Dr. Gersten-
maier on the death of President Kennedy, 22 
November 1963, Video Tape: Sammelträger A 
3144-04 WDR,
9 The president of the Asian Regional Orga-
nization (part of the ICFTUf) PP Narayanan 
described Kennedy as ‘the modern Abraham 
Lincoln’. A similar message from Senator 
PLC Nathan (the National Union of Plan-
tation Workers - NUPW) was distributed to 
more than two thousand Malaysian planta-
tion workers (Tengku orders all flags to be 
flown at half mast, 1963, p. 5).
66 Morgner / Studies in Communication Sciences 17.1 (2017), pp. 57–76
reference without contingencies, forming 
a self-referential semantics that needs no 
further explanation. Referring to Kennedy 
as the guardian of freedom, humanity and 
world peace is seen to be a global refer-
ence, understood by all humanity. Despite 
the contingency and uniqueness of the 
event and the related paradoxical situa-
tion of not being able to fully account for 
it, the mass media made a values-based 
comparison with Lincoln as an uncontest-
able point of reference. Kennedy’s death 
represents an aberration, standing above 
everything, and in this sense, it is a world 
event. 
This analysis demonstrates how the 
global circulation and interlinking of mes-
sages was made possible, in particular, 
through television. The possibility of inter-
rupting a scheduled programme to replace 
media messages by other media messages 
is an important narrative that links mes-
sages to other messages from around the 
globe. TV coverage in the Soviet Union 
and the accompanying interruption itself 
becomes a news item that is broadcast in 
the U.S., Germany and Malaysia. The dis-
course about time and the linking of me-
dia messages to media messages in the 
present become intertwined. Finally, the 
event was compared to other events and 
especially to the assassination of Abraham 
Lincoln. While media coverage of the Ti-
tanic made comparisons in terms of loss 
of life, this comparative mode was much 
more value-driven in the case of Kennedy, 
adverting to a transcendental order that 
would lift this event into the realm of the 
extraordinary. 
2.3 The Fukushima catastrophe
What has become known as the Fukushi-
ma catastrophe or 3.11 refers to a triple 
dis aster in Japan – earthquake, tsunami, 
and nuclear meltdown – on 11 March 2011. 
The meltdown in several reactors of the 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant 
occurred when the plant was hit by a tsu-
nami wave triggered by an undersea earth-
quake off the Pacific coast of To¯hoku. More 
than 15,000 people died and over 300,000 
were evacuated. The estimated economic 
cost was several hundred billion Euros.
Numerous studies have examined 
media coverage of this event (see Katcha-
novski, 2012; Ylönen et al., 2015; Gomez, 
Roses, & Rivera, 2014; Park, Wang, & Pin-
to, 2016; Kristiansen, Bonfadelli, & Kovic, 
2016; Ionescu, 2012; Perko, Turcanu, & 
Gennen, 2012; Schmidt et al., 2012; Laz-
ic & Kaigo, 2013). However, most of these 
studies focused on individual countries 
and mainly traditional media, especially 
newspapers; recent evidence suggests that 
the mediascape informing this event has 
changed somewhat, and that the role of 
social media should be taken into account 
(Friedman, 2011; Digital Archive of Japan’s 
2011 Disasters, 2011; Independent Inves-
tigation & Bricker 2014). As an example, 
Twitter10 experienced a 500% increase in 
tweets from Japan. The volume of tweets 
spiked to more than 5,000 tweets per sec-
ond on several occasions following the tsu-
nami and ensuing nuclear accident, and in 
the first days of the disaster, a total of 177 
million tweets were sent, representing an 
increase of almost a third in tweets at that 
time (Chowdhury, 2011; Twitter, 2011). 
Social media, then, complemented or 
augmented traditional media and other 
new media platforms. For instance, when 
teachers Naoko Utsumi and Koharu Ha-
yashi had to evacuate kindergarten stu-
dents with disabilities, they did not have 
time to flee further inland and evacuated 
the children to the roof of the school. Ms. 
Utsumi emailed what might have been her 
final words to her son, Naohito, from a mo-
bile phone. As Naohito was 10,000 miles 
away in London, he tweeted the message 
and asked anyone who saw it to help. 
Back in Tokyo, Shuichi Suzuki retweet-
ed the message, addressing it to the Vice 
Governor of Tokyo. The latter alerted the 
Disaster Defence Director of Tokyo’s Fire 
Department, which is based in a nearby 
office, and they organised a helicopter to 
rescue everyone safely (see “Rescued from 
a sea of fire (with a Tweet)”, 2011). 
10 It should be noted that Twitter has been very 
popular in Japan, since its Japanese-langu-
age introduction in 2008. Tweeting in Japan 
had become so popular that Japanese is the 
second most used language after English 
(Seshagiri 2014).
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Global media coverage of the event 
made reference to a range of other media 
events. Chernobyl and Three Mile Island 
were referenced in Western media, and 
these were also mentioned in Japanese 
media, along with events closer to home 
such as the Great Kantõ earthquake of 
1923 and the Great Hanshin earthquake 
of 1995. World War II was also mentioned; 
Prime Minister Naoto Kan’s assertion that 
Japan faced its biggest crisis since the war 
was reprinted in a range of media (see 
Branigan, 2011; “Worst crisis since WWII 
– Japan PM”, 2011; Thielke, 2011; “Japan 
Earthquake 2011”, 2011; “Japan PM”, 2011; 
“Japan facing worst crisis since World War 
II: Naoto”, 2011). Across the different me-
dia, this event was contextualised by com-
parison with the destruction of World War 
II, but additionally, 3.11 was framed as a 
challenge, posing the open question of 
whether and how it might be overcome. 
In other words, the past was presented as 
future past – not just looking back, but as 
a reference for possible impacts, possible 
developments and unforeseen conse-
quences. 
Accounts of a contingent future or 
future realities were prevalent across all 
media, as in these Twitter posts: “Electric 
companies know well enough that earth-
quakes could cause the worst to happen 
to a nuclear power plant” (@saltfish_nsk 
2011, emphasis by the author, cited in 
Preston, 2011); and “If people didn’t waste 
electricity, there wouldn’t be a need for 
these facilities and things like this wouldn’t 
have had to happen… We should serious-
ly tackle the issue of electricity waste” (@
mokko0307 2011, emphasis by the author, 
cited in Preston, 2011). This theme was 
also reflected in the major headlines of the 
day; “Japan Reels as Tool Rises and Nuclear 
Risks Loom” (New York Times, 2011, em-
phasis by the author); “Tokyo Warns of Pos-
sibility of another Reactor Hit with a Blast” 
(The Sun [Malaysia], 2011, emphasis by the 
author) and “Angst vor atomarer Katastro-
phe/Fear of Nuclear Disaster” (Frankfurt-
er Allgemeine Zeitung, 2011, emphasis by 
the author). All of these stressed the con-
tingency of what might happen, or what 
could have happened, or should not have 
happened. Typical of the keywords in-
forming these narratives are chaos or hell; 
iconic images stressed destruction, chaos 
and disorientation, as in the picture of a 
girl (Yuko Sugimoto) wrapped in a blanket 
and standing in front of a pile of debris. 
She is alone in the middle of chaos, with 
no visible help or other people; the world 
is turned upside-down, signifying the con-
tingency of future impacts as central to 
the narrative. This notion of contingency 
effectively mandated a re-evaluation of all 
previous communication, as established 
frames of interpretation imploded in the 
face of such destruction. Contingency 
means that the future present could be 
this or that, calling into question how the 
past and the present are organised and 
hindering extrapolation of a possible fu-
ture. As a consequence, the future has to 
be discussed. 
The other strand of the narrative 
aimed at what might be characterised as 
control, in which established frames, pro-
cedures and guidelines suffice to deal with 
the event. This narrative was employed 
when referring to management of the cri-
sis and technical descriptions, as well as to 
reassure the wider public about the safe-
ty of nuclear energy and its role in society 
(Perko, Turcanu, & Gennen, 2012). In prin-
ciple, both narratives can be seen to have a 
global dimension, but it was the element of 
contingency that linked communications 
around the globe – not as a homogenous 
theme but by reformulating the universal 
message of a contingent future according 
to local circumstances. For instance, in 
Germany, which has a strong tradition of 
green thinking, there was a strong local 
reaction to the event. Discussion there 
centred on the role of nuclear energy in 
society and led to the conservative govern-
ment’s decision to end Germany’s nucle-
ar programme. In contrast, discussion in 
Japan focused on the ideology of techno-
logical control and how Japanese culture’s 
avoidance of criticism might have played a 
different role (Martin, 2011; for examples 
from France, see de la Poype & Sood, 2012). 
In short, the unifying symbolism of a con-
tingent future informed a global narrative 
that linked different locales. 
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This universal particularism – and, in 
particular, the question of future impact 
– was central in configuring the image of 
a shared community as global horizon. 
Shared community encompassed two 
aspects: 1) shared, meaning a common 
base of knowledge and understanding and 
2) community, referring to a socio-spatial 
arrangement of all people as part of a sin-
gle society. Any impact on one group in 
this community would be seen as a crisis 
for the whole community, not least be-
cause it would be understood to be trans-
missible in time to all others. For instance, 
the devastating effects of losing friends 
and relatives and the ensuing feelings of 
loss, anger and angst are symbols to which 
anyone can relate. In a guide for users in 
Japan, Twitter stated: “At Twitter, we feel 
that it is part of our duty to do whatever we 
can, no matter how little, to support those 
during times of need like this” (Addison, 
2011). 
As mentioned above, this sharing of a 
future or horizon requires authentication 
at local level. Alexander (2003) showed how 
this demands episodes of repeated cultur-
al, authentic and local communication 
for consolidation of the social metaphors 
that are crucial for a shared understand-
ing of complex events. Social media such 
as Twitter, Google’s People Finder, Mixi, 
Facebook and blogs perform such a role 
(Hickins, 2011; Friedman, 2011). As a good 
example of this (Murthy, 2013; Neal, 2013), 
Twitter combines online social network-
ing and a microblogging service. Its users 
can send and receive short (140-character) 
messages known as tweets, and the service 
can be accessed through web interfaces, 
SMS or mobile device apps. Two import-
ant features of Twitter are the retweet and 
hashtag functions. A retweet is a tweet 
from someone else that can be selected 
and shared with everyone in one’s own 
network. Hashtags allow specific topics 
to be created under which these retweets 
can be summoned. In the case of 3.11, the 
most common hashtags were #fukushima, 
#japanquake and #prayforjapan. The first 
tweet was sent one minute and 25 seconds 
after the earthquake (even before CNN be-
gan to report on the disaster), and the first 
tsunami tweet came six minutes after the 
earthquake (Murthy, 2013). What matters 
here is not just the pace of message distri-
bution but how these linked up with other 
messages as retweets. 
The visualisation of statistical data 
(Chowdhury, 2011) representing the num-
ber and location of tweets from Japan to 
the rest of the world and from the rest of 
the world to Japan immediately after the 
earthquake demonstrates the global dis-
semination of the event via social media 
(see Image 1). However, through Twitter’s 
structure of tweets and retweets, messages 
were not only sent from Japan to the rest 
of the world but circulated back to Japan 
and opened up new circulations and flows 
across the world (see Image 2). 
The structure so created constituted 
a form of global dialogical exchange. Dis-
cussions were not only based on tweets 
but often relied on traditional media re-
ports, creating another link to television 
and newspapers reporting social media 
reactions (Utz, Schultz, & Glocka, 2013). 
Although social media may lack overall 
credibility, the reliability of messages is 
assured by a chain of trusted people that 
includes someone directly involved in the 
event (Thompson & Ito, 2012). This instant 
global dialogue enabled participants to 
engage in discussion about the meaning 
of the event. That meaning and its future 
implications are not assessed by the indi-
vidual but by a community of actors who 
verify or update the subject. In such cir-
cumstances, it is likely that contingency 
can be better expressed, paying more at-
tention both to doubts and to interpreta-
tion (Binder, 2012; Li, Vishwanath, & Rao, 
2014). It is exactly this potential for many 
people to voice their concerns that lends 
relevance to the event, enabling feelings of 
community and togetherness to be built as 
each individual shares in mourning a loss 
in a distant region: 
Despite residing in L.A., I began to feel that I 
might be able to contribute to helping peo-
ple through my personal use of social me-
dia. I myself began harnessing social media 
to participate in circulating the data the DIY 
movement collected. This experience made 
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me realize that I should use my research to do 
something for people who are suffering from 
not knowing the risks of unknown exposure to 
nuclear radiation in Japan. (Abe, n.d.)
Based on a network of traditional and 
media systems, the linking of messag-
es through the narrative of a contingent 
future enabled the formation of a global 
Image 1: Global circulation of tweets. White lines indicate tweets from Japan; blue lines are replies. 
(Source: Twitter, “Twitter Stories: the world connects during the To¯hoku earthquake” https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=SybWjN9pKQk)
Image 2: Global circulation of tweets. White lines indicate tweets from Japan; blue lines are replies; 
green and yellow lines represent retweeted messages. (Source: Twitter, “Twitter Stories: the 
world connects during the To¯hoku earthquake” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SybWjN9p-
KQk)
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horizon, as messages could be related to 
various local contexts and so incorporate 
a global audience. In combination with 
new media and social media, the notion 
of time and, in particular, the contingency 
of future developments created a horizon, 
bringing a global audience under the same 
umbrella. 
3 Summary: the role of time in the 
global mediascape
Many of the authors mentioned earlier 
have linked globalisation to the develop-
ment of new communication technolo-
gies. Since the 1970s, satellite- and com-
puter-based communication have created 
a global world. However, the present anal-
ysis of media coverage of the Kennedy as-
sassination and especially of the sinking of 
the Titanic demonstrates that the global 
circulation and interlinking of messages 
was already possible at the beginning of 
the twentieth century. New technologies 
had not simply triggered interest in these 
events but were embedded in organisa-
tional and institutional procedures (news 
reporting, printing cycles) and social set-
tings (those who could afford and read 
newspapers). The temporal structures 
and media communication of the sinking 
of the Titanic show how the (re-)print-
ing cycles of daily newspapers, wireless 
telegraphy and undersea cables, along 
with media practices employing time as 
a narrative device (surprise, shock, com-
parison), enable meaning-making that 
can encompass the globe. In this context, 
the overview also demonstrates how the 
narrative linking messages to other mes-
sages can take different forms, influenced 
by historical shifts in what news analysis 
refers to as elite nations (see Galtung & 
Ruge, 1965). For instance, while the glob-
al network of messages during the Titanic 
episode encompassed reactions in Britain 
and Germany, media coverage following 
the assassination of Kennedy focused on 
the United States and the Soviet Union, 
and the Fukushima catastrophe shows 
more diversified interlinking. 
In all of this, time is not merely a sup-
port structure in the form of a technology 
that disseminates information and there-
fore a neutral agent. Rather, time plays a 
constitutive role in the process of mean-
ing-making in the global mediascape. 
As frameworks, semantics and schemes 
of time and remembering are employed 
by the media to lend meaning to their 
communications, within a structure that 
compares the relevance of various me-
dia messages. The value-laden nature of 
these historical contrasts serves to instal 
this relevance at different levels of society, 
creating meaning that positions events 
at a global level. While the past seems to 
be used to designate meaning, the future 
serves as a horizon of possibility, reflection 
and negotiation of meaning, in a contin-
gent future that may or may not come to 
pass. Here, time is not simply a chronolog-
ical dimension of media communication 
or programming but assumes the role of a 
symbolic structure that can create mean-
ing by questioning the world and engaging 
in dialogue. The contingent future is not 
just depending on individual decisions, 
but the future present itself is to be decid-
ed upon. The contingency of this phenom-
enon is based on a media infrastructure, 
where this contingency can be reflected 
upon. 
Current approaches to media events 
theorise this phenomenon as ritual or cer-
emony (see Dayan & Katz, 1992); what in-
tegrates the different acts and messages is 
their effect on society at its core, inducing 
a tacit, underlying, normative consensus 
that lends meaning to the whole event. 
This paper contends that while values play 
an important role in making sense of such 
global events, they are much more a func-
tion of a media recollection of past events. 
However, the present analysis suggests 
another theoretical approach. The simul-
taneous connectivity of global commu-
nication seems not to rest on this hidden 
normative ground but on a structure with-
in global media communication not unlike 
what conversation analysis characterises 
as “turn taking”, where one participant re-
fers to and anticipates what the other par-
ticipant will say, as both participants react 
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almost simultaneously. This structure is 
characteristic of the circular, compact na-
ture of news broadcasts, lending an inner 
density to what has happened and shaping 
it into an event (Button, 1984). 
Mass media coverage of the cases dis-
cussed here – the sinking of the Titanic, 
the assassination of John F. Kennedy and 
3.11 – took on a worldwide dimension in 
referencing other media reports, linking 
messages through a kind of intertextuality. 
Following Mead (1967), a theory of media 
event communication can be formulated 
as a three-part social process for the con-
stitution of meaning, in which an initial 
gesture, comment or item of news is ac-
companied by a reaction and subsequent 
consequential behaviour. Beyond one’s 
personal reaction, the reactions of others 
appear different and may prompt further 
connections. Consequently, one reflects 
on the reactions of others in light of one’s 
own reaction(s), and vice versa. This re-
quires two things: a follow-up response 
must be possible, and the respective re-
sponses must be perceptible. In terms of 
time, this means that the news should not 
be out of date or subsumed into a broader 
or different context, and any subsequent 
reaction must remain identifiable as a fol-
low-up communication. This means that 
participants must remain consistently in 
the loop if they are to make these connec-
tions without losing time, catching up with 
the news as it happens. It follows that the 
meaning-making of global media com-
munication may be better described as a 
form of network-like arrangement, where 
meaning unfolds and other meanings are 
interwoven to give the event an internal 
consistency, scale and dynamic (see Mor-
gner, 2009). 
Finally, the typology proposed to ac-
count for the role of time has three funda-
mental dimensions: 1) the role of past and 
future, 2) metacommunication about time 
and 3) the connection of actual messages 
to other existing messages. This typology 
proved useful in comparing different me-
dia from different stages of the global me-
diascape. First, the typology revealed com-
mon features across all the selected events, 
such as the interlinking of messages, cita-
tion and intertextual meaning-making, 
from the sinking of the Titanic in the age 
of newspapers to the Fukushima incident 
in the age of tweets and retweets. In this 
sense, there is a surprising consistency in 
how these global structures unfold. Sec-
ond, the typology also revealed variations 
within these dimensions. It seems that the 
process of meaning-making is not uniform 
but can be differentially informed by cer-
tain conceptions of time. While the con-
tingent future predominated during the 
Fukushima incident, the role of memory 
seems to have exerted a greater influence 
on meaning-making in media coverage of 
the assassination of John F. Kennedy, and 
reporting of the Titanic was shaped by me-
ta-communication about time, especially 
with regard to wireless telegraphy. Taken 
together, these findings clearly illustrate 
that time is crucial to meaning-making in 
global media communication. 
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